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Abstract—This paper proposes a non-traditional XML
database which supports biometric templates and provides
an API which can be used by independent applications in
mobile device environments. Until recently biometric systems
are becoming more and more visible in mobile phone devices
including ﬁngerprint recognition or gait recognition. To gain a
real understanding of how it is possible to protect the biometric
data, this paper ﬁrst starts out with introducing a technique
for security in a biometric system and emphasizes that template
protection is important by going through the vulnerabilities and
threats. Furthermore, it points out requirements for template
protection, a recital of various template protection schemes and
a brief overview of biometric standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric systems have evolved into a security arrangement,
that can be trusted to authenticate users’ access to a given
system. One of the advantages by using a biometric security
system is that the users can avoid remembering a password
or any other secret combination to be authenticated and gain
access to a system. Another (theoretical) advantage is that a
truly biometric identiﬁer is only available to the subject itself
and can never be forged. These advantages should ensure a
more secure system and also enhance the user experience in
the authentication process.
An article [1] proposes biometric gait recognition using
mobile devices. The research team has already implemented
one application on an iPhone-based phone containing an
embedded accelerometer sensor. With the application, they
have completed preliminary data analysis and obtained results
on using gait to determine the correct identity of a given
person walking. Furthermore, it shows that it is possible to
successfully implement biometric gait recognition on a mobile
device. Nevertheless, the article does not mention a security
analysis of the system and a system is only as secure as its
weakest link [9]. The problem is if the mobile device gets
stolen, it will become useless, but the thief would most likely
seek to try to gain access by attacking in different kind of
ways than trying to replicate the gait of the original owner.
Every security system is exposed to attacks and one crucial
attack, in our case, is on the biometric system database.
Most biometric systems authenticate a user based on a local
biometric template (T ) and a biometric sample (B) given by
the user during the authentication process. Obviously, if the
protection of the biometric template is not optimal it can lead
to successful attacks on the biometric system and eventually
to unauthorized access. Securing data on mobile embedded
devices is hard and not direct forward, since there exist limi-
tations (speed, memory, battery and changing environments).
In this work we have not conducted any experiments to
prevent an attack on the templates, instead we illustrate a
research proposal on how it is possible to secure the data.
II. BIOMETRIC SYSTEM
The conceptual architecture of a biometric system con-
sists of ﬁve major components [2]: sensor, feature extrac-
tor, template database, matcher and a decision component1.
Furthermore, the system can in a given moment be in one
of two phases. One phase is enrollment and the other is
authentication.
A. Enrollment
In the enrollment phase, the system registers, with the aid of
a sensor, a user’s behavior or physiology - earlier referred to
as a biometric sample. From the registered sample, biometric
features are extracted with the help of a feature extractor.
These features will be a subset of data from the original
sample, this reduction in data can remove any superﬂuous
information, which is not relevant in the later authentication
phase. Furthermore, to only save relevant data will improve
the resource and speed performance of the overall system. In a
security system it is also a good paradigm to save only the least
information as possible due to privacy concerns [10]. These
features are saved in the biometric template. However, human
behavior is not always deterministic, and because of variations
in the actual measurement of the behavior or physiology, it can
be an advantage to register multiple samples from the user in
the enrollment phase. Finally, the generated template is saved
in the biometric system database.
B. Authentication
In the authentication phase, the user gives a ’live’ biometric
sample. This sample is then compared with a biometric
template from the biometric system database. The template
can either be retrieved by claiming an identity or letting the
sample be compared to all existing templates in the database.
This comparison is made in the matcher component and would
output a match score. The identity decision is, however, made
1In some systems the matcher and decision components are joined together
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by the decision component and will, based on the decision,
either authorize or deny access to the system.
C. Vulnerabilities
Fig. 1. Various vulnerabilities in a biometric system [2]
There exist different biometric system vulnerabilities and
the causes [3] are adapted from the ﬁsh-bone model [2] in
ﬁgure 1. Exploiting these vulnerabilities can lead to severe
attacks on the biometric system. [4] identiﬁes eight possible
attacks in a biometric system.
Furthermore, [2] distinguishes between intrinsic failures and
failures due to an adversary attack. Intrinsic failures occur
when an internal error occurs in one of the ﬁve components.
Especially two failures are of utmost importance: false accept
and false reject2.
False acceptance is the case where either an attacker tries
to gain access with a forged biometric sample and the system
authorizes the attacker or if a user is accepted as a different
user. False rejection occurs when an authentic user is denied
access based on a given biometric sample. Both rejections is a
result of the algorithm for feature extraction being too vague,
thereby the sampling of the user’s features is not sufﬁciently
distinguishable and the system cannot (correctly) single out
the correct template. If the biometric sample even cannot be
measured (e.g., malfunctioning hardware or too much noise)
failures such as failure-to-enroll (FTE) or failure-to-acquire
(FTA) arises.
In addition, variations in behavior and noise in the sensor
measurement can lead to inaccurate biometric samples which
again can affect the decision of authorization. To ensure
reliability it is necessary to control and calibrate the tech-
nology used for collecting the biometric sample. [5] describes
progressing research within design of sensors, algorithms and
template schemes to reduce the probability of intrinsic failures;
2Derivatives are False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR),
which are statistical quantities that can indicate the accuracy performance
it also claims advantages in making use of fusion methodolo-
gies to integrate multiple different biometric features, called
multibiometrics.
1) Biometric template database: In this proposal we will
emphasize protecting the template, thus it is the template
database (in ﬁgure 2) which is relevant. An attack on the
biometric template database is possibly the most critical in
the whole biometric system, which can lead to these three
vulnerabilities [2]:
• Replacement of a forged or invalid template
• Reconstruction of biometric samples from template
• Abuse of the templates to cross-match with other appli-
cations
Fig. 2. Template database is a critical point in a biometric system, adapted
from [2]
D. Privacy threats
A person has limited biometric identiﬁers and ironically
some of their strengths are also their weaknesses. There are
multiple privacy threats regarding a biometric identiﬁer. One is
that a biometric identiﬁer represents a real identity and thereby
always can be linked to a real life person. [6] mentions that it is
possible to extract critical information from a saved biometric
template. Many biometric features reveals ethnic background,
genetic or medical conditions. Thus, speculative companies
can abuse this information, e.g., to calculate the probability
for feature health conditions for a given person and estimate
an insurance premium based on that3.
Moreover, biometrics cannot be updated or revoked. If a
biometric system is compromised and an attacker gets hold of
the biometric features or templates it can cause a breach in
security and privacy. [7] has proved that a full ﬁngerprint can
be reconstructed from the minutia points. Similar reconstruc-
tions could be done with other biometrics. Thus, the attacker
has the opportunity to impersonate the users registered in the
biometric system.
3Just an example - a discussion in ethics is not in this proposal’s scope
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III. REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION
Based on the aforementioned vulnerabilities and threats, all
biometric templates in biometric system should be optimally
secured and protected. Nevertheless, [6] puts up a set of
requirements for template protection which safeguards both
privacy and security in biometric systems.
A. Privacy requirements
• Identity privacy: The relation between the biometric
data and identity data must be highly protected. So if
either one is revealed it would still be difﬁcult to track
down the other.
• Irreversibility: Transform the biometric sample into a
biometric template which cannot be transformed back to
the sample again. In case templates are leaked it should
not be possible to reconstruct the original biometric
features.
• Unlinkability: Biometric template used in one applica-
tion for a given user and a given set of biometric features
should not be identical or similar in other applications
using the same algorithm for generation of biometric
templates. Making it hard for the attacker to determine
if ’different’ templates are identical or generated by the
same algorithm.
B. Security requirements
• Conﬁdentiality: Both the biometric database and all
communication between each component should be pro-
tected against all trivial man-in-the-middle attacks and
modiﬁcation of data.
• Integrity: Since biometric features are highly volatile,
accuracy and integrity of data are important. All compo-
nents should be reliable in both phases of the biometric
system.
• Renewability and revocability: There exist a high desire
to make use of templates which either can be renewed
or revoked. Otherwise, a user can never re-access a
biometric system once his or her biometric template is
compromised or stolen. A possibility is to be able to
extract a different set of biometric features from the
sample to generate a new biometric template4.
IV. TEMPLATE PROTECTION SCHEMES
The requirements are meant to help create a template
protection scheme. Nevertheless, the protection should not
devalue the system performance (FAR/FRR or speed). The
template protection schemes we have looked at can bluntly
be split into two categories [2]: Feature transformation or
Biometric cryptosystems.
4Provided that the attacker was not able to reconstruct the complete
biometric sample from the template
A. Feature transformation
A feature transformation scheme applies a transformation
function (F), to the biometric template. The function, how-
ever, often requires parameters which are obtained from a
random key (K) and thereby creating a transformed template
(F(T ,K)). Because it is only the transformed template that
is saved in the database, this transformation happens in both
enrollment and authentication phase.
1) Salting: The salting transformation function uses a key
or password to create the transformed template, but this
template is invertible, so it make demands to protect the key
or password.
2) Non-invertible transform: A non-invertible transforma-
tion makes use of a one-way function, so the transformed
template will be easy and quick to generate - but trying to
ﬁnd the given original template as input will computationally
be hard.
B. Biometric cryptosystems
Biometric cryptosystems deviate from feature transforma-
tions by making use of external data, helper data (H). Helper
data does not contain many details about the original biometric
template.
1) Key-binding biometric cryptosystem: When a biometric
cryptosystem is key-binding the (key in the) helper data is
independent of the biometric template. The helper data is cre-
ated by using both the template and a key. This key is obtained
from a sub application (which generates a cryptographic key).
2) Key generation biometric cryptosystem: Opposite of
being independent of the biometric template, a key generation
biometric cryptosystem makes use of the biometric template
in the generation of the key.
C. Summing up
In [2] a comparison between the four schemes have been
made and their conclusion is, that there exist no ’best’ ap-
proach for template protection. A biometric system’s purpose
and scenario has a huge impact on which scheme is suitable.
Nevertheless, within each scheme there is research going on
to optimize known problems in the matcher, basically so
the inter- and intra-user variations are better handled. Other
research is going on to clear out the requirements of the
schemes. [8] indicates that some of the security requirements
often are misunderstood and claims the common (practical)
techniques are lacking. Hence, an optimal scheme for the
biometric system used in [1] has to be carefully designed
based on an analysis of the different scenarios involved of
the application.
V. BIOMETRIC STANDARDS
The biometric industry has existed for many years. Helped
by horrible terrorist events and criminal attacks there has been
a focus on creating a biometric standard to prevent imperson-
ation and theft of identities. Particularly, a lot of effort has been
put in specifying a standard that enhances the interoperability
between application domains. Even though biometric security
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systems become more and more mature, biometric is a vast
concept and there is a need for an open standard. In the
literature their exist ambiguous and ’private’ terminologies [6].
A standard will help specifying proved and thought-through
security and privacy requirements. Especially, seen from a
distributed and interoperable point of view it is crucial to
have standards, so different and otherwise distinct biometric
systems can interoperate. The (later described) BioAPI is an
example of a closed standard, but open standards should be
considered and an open standard does not necessarily mean
that the system becomes less secure, in many cases quite the
contrary [10].
A. BioAPI
One of the ﬁrst key speciﬁcations was the Biometric Appli-
cation Programming Interface (BioAPI). BioAPI speciﬁes how
different applications can interact with each other and make
use of high-level generic biometric enrollment and authentica-
tion. It even includes a database interface and enables various
applications to have different roles. So a client-application can
capture the biometric sample, transmit it to a server-application
- which does the actual processing and authentication - and
respond back to the client-application.
B. CBEFF
Nonetheless, to support interoperability of biometric data
and to do so platform independently (which was one of the re-
quirements of BioAPI) there was a need for a data description
format. So the BioAPI consortium members came up with the
Common Biometric Exchange File Format (CBEFF). CBEFF
was made to represent different kinds of biometric data,
ranging from advanced biometric features, which required
complex data structures, to simplistic ones. This ﬂexibility
gave the designer of a biometric system the opportunity to
deﬁne biometric data structures according to the platform and
hardware the biometric system will be running on.
C. XCBF
One of the two formats deﬁned in CBEFF made use of Ab-
stract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). Even with a standardized
description language in CBEFF, the format was binary-based
and could not overcome the challenges in data transmission
on the Internet [11], where XML had gained foothold. So it
cleared the way for a new speciﬁcation. XML had become
more and more the common format for data transport over
the internet, especially in the hype of Web 2.0. So deﬁning
a biometric XML schema, XML Common Biometric Format
(XCBF) [12], was applauded.
VI. PROPOSED XML DATABASES
A lot of data is extracted from traditional databases and
converted to XML documents [13], hence it may be more
efﬁcient to store the data in XML, instead of creating the
conversion overhead for every request. Thus, many traditional
databases5 began to support XML [14], however, they typi-
cally implemented an extra ’XML-layer’ on top of the existing
database management system. Thereafter the conversion was
just moved from elsewhere to the database, not reducing the
overhead signiﬁcantly. The term XML-enabled was given to
these kinds of databases. There emerged a different kind of
database, non-traditional databases6, which were XML-native.
Opposed to a traditional database, which will have tuples as
its fundamental unit of logical storage, a native XML database
will use an XML document as its fundamental unit of logical
storage.
A. BaseX
BaseX is an example of a native XML database. This
speciﬁc database supports the two APIs, XML:DB API (XAPI)
and XQuery API for Java speciﬁcation (XQJ). Both APIs
try to help create queries in an easy manner, the latter with
the use of W3C XQuery speciﬁcation and supporting ACID-
safe transactions7. The database seems to be lightweight, yet
powerful and efﬁcient to be installed on a mobile device.
B. A biometric XML Database
As of today there exist no (XML) database, which supports
the XCBF speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, there is an indigence
of a secure storage system that can protect the biometric
templates needed in a biometric system. As non-traditional
(text) databases becomes more and more favored on embedded
and mobile devices, it makes sense to take advantage of a
biometric XML schema to save the biometric templates.
VII. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF XCBF:API
It would be convenient to extend one of the existing native
XML databases, which does a good job of providing basic
features and API support. BaseX is written in Java and many
mobile platforms supports Java in some way. Nonetheless,
generally these mobile platforms (e.g. Google Android) run
a virtual machine which supports a limited version of Java.
So extending BaseX with the XCBF speciﬁcation and port
the ﬁnal database to run under Google Android’s version of
Java or Java Mobile Edition would be one practical approach.
A. XCBF:API
A biometric (database) API, XCBF:API, gives applications
on the embedded, mobile device a way of communicating with
a central biometric template storage, hence the opportunity to
interoperate with each other. Creating a Java library/package
(e.g. org.basex.xcbf) with classes and interfaces that
provides an API, following the XCBF standard, is straight
forward.
One of the key features of the new API is to provide
methods to create a biometric template (based on the XCBF
schema) and thereafter verify and validate the XML document
5Often equal to Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS)
6These databases distinguish themselves by being speciﬁcally optimal in
handling one kind of data - e.g., text, spatial or temporal
7http://basex.org/
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Fig. 3. Enrollment and authentication phases after implementing XCBF with
feature transformation in BaseX
(biometric template) according to the XCBF schema, when the
application tries to store it into the template database. There
exist multiple tools and technologies to help with this - Java
API for XML Processing (JAXP) would be ideal to make use
of.
Beside implementing the XCBF speciﬁcation into an API, it
is an advantage to extend the API further with functionalities,
that makes the database attractive for applications who intend
to make use of it as a part of a biometric security system.
The following extensions are complicated and should be
designed and modelled carefully, with especially the earlier
stated requirements in mind.
B. Build-in template protection
Since XCFB is a speciﬁcation for the data format it does not
provide the actual template protection schemes. Instead of each
application using its own template protection scheme it would
be greater to integrate multiple standard template protection
schemes in the database. Via the API each application can
make use of whichever protection scheme that suits their
application.
A prerequisite for the extended API is to implement the
template protection schemes and fulﬁll the security and pri-
vacy requirements stated in section III. Figure 3 shows an
illustration of how a template gets transformed using feature
transformation during enrollment and authentication. In the
authentication phase there can either be an internal or external
matcher. An application making use of an external matcher
Fig. 4. Enrollment and authentication phases after implementing XCBF with
a biometric cryptosystem in BaseX
has to query with a biometric template and the database
will return a transformed template, which can be matched
with a transformed template got with a claimed identity from
the database. Letting the database provide enhanced template
protection for a biometric template.
C. Internal matching
Furthermore, we propose to join the matcher and storage
component into one biometric template protection database.
This is illustrated in the ﬁgure with the internal matching, so
that the database in fact can do the matching of the templates
and output a matching score. We assume this join would
enhance the overall performance of the system. The database
creates the biometric template and has the knowledge regard-
ing the build-in template protection. Thus, optimal algorithms
and XML operations can be created to compare the biometric
sample and the biometric template stored in the database.
The calculated score can then be used by an application to
make a ﬁnal decision, moreover, the score can be used across
applications.
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Figure 4 shows how the biometric template can get stored
using a biometric cryptosystem. As earlier stated the database
can either store a template which is bound with a crypto-
graphic key independent of the template or one where the
cryptographic key is generated based on the template. The
matching is done by checking the validity of the extracted
key, which again can be done either internally or externally.
This type of system should also take into consideration the
intra-user variations in the biometric template - e.g. to impose
error correction mechanisms.
D. Hybrid template protection schemes
The proposed template protection schemes in the current
literature are either vague or too simplistic [2]. As earlier stated
an optimal template protection scheme for one application, is
maybe not suitable for another application or even in another
context of the same application. We propose to study these
schemes further with regard to the possible user scenarios and
design hybrid schemes which can transform multiple (differ-
ent) biometric samples or template. So the overall biometric
system becomes truly multi-biometric. Whichever application
who wants to make use of the database can choose the optimal
protection scheme, without being troubled to implement one
by themselves.
E. Interoperability
Another incentive - to deploy a biometric system with this
API and database - is to allow different applications to interact
with a given user’s template. Basically, the enrollment process
can happen once and all applications can make use of the
saved biometric template and correctly authenticate a user,
since there (in theory) only can exist one identity with the
given biometric template.
F. Implementation
Each of the extensions is going to be a part of the database
and has to be somehow modelled and thereafter implemented.
The actual transformations of a template into a transformed
template could be done with XSL Transformation (XSLT),
which is a declarative powerful XML-based language. XSLT’s
core purpose is to transform one XML document into an-
other XML document based on template rules from a XLTS-
stylesheet. Figure 5 shows how the ﬂow works for trans-
forming one XML document to another, where the resulting
document would be the transformed biometric template (or
helper data) and the processor can be achieved with the help
of JAXB.
Doing the internal matching (especially intrauser varia-
tions), hybrid template protection schemes and interoperability
is partly to model algorithms, heuristics and implement them
using various XML-based languages (XQuery and XPath) there
are to manipulate or query a document. So these various
’scripts’ will run in the backend of the database, while the
API (frontend) will provide elegant embedded functions and
methods.
Fig. 5. Showing the transformation ﬂow [15]
VIII. FUTURE WORK
The XCBF:API should lead to an efﬁcient, biometric secure
and (not only non-traditional, but) newfangled database. The
research proposed would lead to hybrid template protection
schemes and a biometric system capable of handling multiple
biometric features. The application will be able to distinguish
between different varieties of schemes, choosing the one which
is most suitable. The rapidly growing market for mobile
devices with sensors that can extract various biometric features
needs a database, that provides the necessary protection,
security, reliability and interoperability.
The general threat model for storing templates in a database
can signiﬁcantly be eliminated if the XCBF:API is imple-
mented in a database.
As earlier stated, this paper is a research proposal. Hence,
it lacks an actual implementation, experiments, results and an
in-depth theoretical security analysis of our proposed design.
The suggested implementation is meant as a starting point
to further research; it should also ease an conceptual idea of
our proposed design. However, some problems with the tools
and libraries (e.g. BaseX or JAXP) put forward would only
become evident during the implementation stage. Another tool
design could very well be more suitable for our proposed
implementation design. For instance, BaseX currently runs
under Java 6 and mobile devices could make use of a limited
Java (Mobile) edition. Hence, a porting of BaseX to mobile
devices is necessary and maybe not straight forward. Our
proposed XCBF:API is not limited to BaseX, so XML-native
databases developed for Apple’s iPhone, RIM’s Blackberry or
a whole third mobile device are also options. Nevertheless, the
criteria and arguments for selecting the tools stated in section
VI and section VII still stand.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this proposal we have given an overview of the concep-
tual architecture of a biometric system and how template pro-
tection is an essential part of such a system in mobile device
environments. The XCBF:API is put forward and proposed as
a protection to secure templates in a database. This API would
protect biometric templates efﬁciently on mobile devices, since
a customizable template protection scheme can be chosen. We
favour a non-traditional (XML) text database over a traditional
due to the limitations on a mobile and embedded device.
Furthermore, an XML database provides us with querying and
data manipulation (e.g, XQuery and XPath) facilities, which
can be more abstract and suitable than resource-demanding
(low-level) SQL. Finally, we prosed a database which is
application- and technology independent. Thus, a high level of
interoperability between various applications can be achieved.
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